

GC

JUN 26 1968

Dear Dick:

Now that the United Nations General Assembly has commended the Non-Proliferation Treaty for signature by a large majority of 95 to 4 with 21 abstentions and in view of your interest as expressed when we met in Geneva last year, I thought you might find useful an updating of the situation. In addition to the General Assembly approval, the Security Council also passed an assurances resolution reflecting conditions resulting from the qualitatively new situation in the world due to nuclear developments. I will cover both of these developments in more detail in the following paragraphs.

The main provisions of the present draft Non-Proliferation Treaty may be summarized as follows: The Treaty would 1) prohibit nuclear-weapon-states from transferring to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them, 2) prohibit nuclear-weapon-states from helping non-nuclear-weapon nations to develop their own nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 3) prohibit non-nuclear weapon states from receiving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and from manufacturing their own, 4) provide for effective safeguards to assure that no nuclear materials are diverted to nuclear weapons, 5) encourage cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon nations to insure that all will benefit from the

The Honorable

Richard M. Nixon,

450 Park Avenue,

New York, New York 10022

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL  
DATE: DECEMBER 19, 2019

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peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and 6) affirm the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon-states to strive for effective measures to end the nuclear arms race and promote disarmament. Negotiating developments within the past year related largely to the last 3 points.

At the time of our visit in Geneva last spring, the United States was trying to work out a resolution to the safeguards problem satisfactory to our NATO allies and at the same time acceptable to the Soviet Union. The impasse continued until the early fall of 1967 when the Soviets finally came up with a new compromise draft safeguards article based in part on an earlier NATO draft. This proposal was presented to the capitals of alliance members, to the North Atlantic Council, and to Euratom for discussion. What emerged was the United States compromise draft of November 2, which was given a "green light" by NAC. Throughout November and December we urged Soviet acceptance of the November 2 draft as being the road through which agreement lay. When the ENDC reconvened on January 18, 1968, after a month's recess, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a complete draft treaty, including the Article III on safeguards approved by the North Atlantic Council in November. Further information on Article III is contained in enclosures 2 and 3 to this letter.

Negotiations on other aspects of the treaty continued at the ENDC until March 14 of this year when the draft was reported to the UN General Assembly. Additional amendments, responsive to suggestions by various non-nuclear-weapon countries, were agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union. The most important revisions, which were reflected in the treaty text endorsed by the General Assembly on June 12, strengthen the provisions for sharing in the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Articles IV,V), and the provisions calling for further and prompt measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit existing arsenals (Preamble, Article VI).

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A concluding preambular paragraph was also added to enhance the security of the signatories by reaffirming the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding the use and threats of force in international relations.

Related to the last paragraph is the concern expressed by a number of non-aligned countries that, should they adhere to a non-proliferation treaty and forego the option of developing nuclear weapons, they would subject themselves to possible nuclear blackmail. To deal with this problem, on March 7, the United States, Soviet, and United Kingdom Representatives joined at the ENDC in introducing a draft UN Security Council resolution on security assurances. It was adopted by the Security Council on June 19 by a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions.

The resolution (enclosure 4) is intended to reassure non-aligned nations of their security should they become Parties to the Treaty. The resolution would not involve the United States in any new commitment, but would recognize that "aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter".

The Treaty will be opened for signature on July 1 in Washington, London and Moscow. The President will then transmit it to the Senate for its advice and consent. We hope that the strong bipartisan support it has received will soon result in Senate consent to its ratification.

I do not believe that the Non-Proliferation Treaty can last unless it is followed within a reasonable time by additional arms control steps, especially with regard to the nuclear arms race between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Progress towards this end is considered necessary for the continued adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by many non-nuclear-weapon countries.

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The United States has proposed such steps. As you may recall, President Eisenhower, in a letter to Premier Bulganin on March 1, 1956, proposed an international agreement to cut-off the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes under international safeguards, and the transfer of such material to peaceful uses. This idea has been built upon and urged by the United States ever since then.

Similarly, the United States proposed 3 years ago that the Geneva Disarmament Conference explore the possibility of a missile freeze. ABM systems were included in this proposal. The Soviet Union has not yet entered into such negotiations with us, but an encouraging statement was made by Mr. Kuznetsov at the United Nations a few weeks ago when he said that the Soviet Union was "prepared to agree on concrete steps aimed at limiting and, subsequently, reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons". If such agreements could be effected, I hope you would agree with me that both our security and our economy would benefit.

I hope this letter and its enclosures will be helpful to you and that you will not hesitate to let me know if you would like any further information.

Warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

William C. Foster

Enclosures:

1. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Text
2. Developments Leading to US Draft NPT
3. Pertinent Questions and Answers Regarding NPT
4. Security Council Resolution on Assurances

ACDA/GC:MChristopher:jen:6/24/68

June 26, 1968

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY PACKETAttached are:

1. The text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The main provisions of the treaty may be summarized as follows: The treaty would 1) prohibit nuclear-weapon-states from transferring to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them, 2) prohibit nuclear-weapon-states from helping non-nuclear-weapon nations to develop their own nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 3) prohibit non-nuclear-weapon states from receiving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or from manufacturing their own, 4) provide for effective safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon states to assure that no nuclear materials are diverted to nuclear weapons, 5) encourage cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon nations to insure that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and 6) affirm the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon-states to strive for effective measures to end the nuclear arms race and promote disarmament.
2. The UN General Assembly Resolution commending the treaty for signature on June 12, 1968, by a vote of 95 to 4 (with 21 abstentions). The countries voting against the Resolution of endorsement were Albania, Cuba, Tanzania and Zambia.
3. President Johnson's address to the UN General Assembly on June 12.
4. The Resolution on security assurances adopted by the Security Council on June 19, 1968, by a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions, and the statement of the U.S. Representative explaining the Resolution. The Resolution and the statement of explanation make clear that any threat or aggression involving nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be brought before the Security Council immediately. The Resolution would not involve the United States in any new commitment.
5. Developments Leading to U.S. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty.
6. Questions and Answers on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

June 14, 1968

Text of Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

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Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.



2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

#### ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

#### ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

#### ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

#### ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into

force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to

all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

#### ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ this \_\_\_\_\_  
of \_\_\_\_\_.

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLYA/RES/2373 (XXII)  
18 June 1968Twenty-second session  
Agenda item 28 (a)

## RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7016/Add.1)]

2373 (XXII). Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsThe General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2346 A (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2149 (XXI) of 4 November 1966, 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 and 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961,

Convinced of the urgency and great importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and of intensifying international co-operation in the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, dated 14 March 1968,<sup>1/</sup> and appreciative of the work of the Committee on the elaboration of the draft non-proliferation treaty, which is attached to that report,<sup>2/</sup>

Convinced that, pursuant to the provisions of the treaty, all signatories have the right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will be able to acquire source and special fissionable materials, as well as equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes,

<sup>1/</sup> A/7072.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., annex I.

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Convinced further that an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim,

Affirming that in the interest of international peace and security both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States carry the responsibility of acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations that the sovereign equality of all States shall be respected, that the threat or use of force in international relations shall be refrained from and that international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means,

1. Commends the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;
2. Requests the Depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;
3. Expresses the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States;
4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;
5. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

1672nd plenary meeting,  
12 June 1968.

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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release USUN-94(68)  
June 12, 1968

ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

BY

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, Your Excellencies,  
Delegates to the General Assembly:

I have asked for the privilege of addressing you this  
afternoon.

- to acknowledge this momentous event in the history of  
nations;
- and to pledge, on behalf of the United States, our  
determination to make this but a first step toward  
ending the peril of nuclear war.

Four and a half years ago -- shortly after the awesome  
responsibility of leadership was thrust into my hands -- I  
instructed our negotiators at Geneva to seek a treaty to prevent  
the spread of nuclear weapons.

I recalled the modest and mutual reductions in arms spending  
that had been achieved by the United States and the Soviet Union.  
And I said then,

"Let us pray that the tide has turned -- that further  
and more far-reaching agreements lie ahead -- and that  
future generations will mark 1964 as the year the world  
turned for all time away from the horrors of war and  
constructed new bulwarks for peace."

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL  
DATE: DECEMBER 19, 2019



Four and a half years of patient and painstaking negotiations at Geneva -- and of further debate and refinement here in the United Nations -- were to follow. Now, at last, the work of many governments has become one instrument of international peace and sanity. The hands of many peoples have written a testament to reason -- and to the will of mankind to endure.

The resolution that you have just approved commends to the governments of the world -- for their speedy ratification -- the treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began.

It goes far to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

It commits the nuclear powers to redouble their efforts to end the nuclear arms race, and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

It will insure equitable sharing of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy -- under effective safeguards -- for the benefit of all nations.

On behalf of the government and the people of the United States, let me congratulate all who have contributed to this historic event.

But we should not linger long in mutual congratulation. The quest -- and the need -- for disarmament is too urgent for that.

Many further steps are needed if this treaty is to fulfill its great purposes, and if we are to move beyond it toward the ultimate goal that we all seek, peace in the world.

As regards the treaty itself, no time should be lost in bringing it into force. I pledge you this afternoon that we of the United States will move rapidly

- to open the treaty for signature;
- to sign it on behalf of our own government;
- and to seek its prompt ratification in accordance with our Constitution.

We shall urge other nations to complete their ratification speedily, so that the treaty can enter into force at the earliest possible date.

I further pledge that -- as soon as the treaty has entered into force -- we of the United States will carry out our responsibilities under it in full measure.

First, we shall fully and scrupulously discharge our obligations as a nuclear weapon party; not to transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them, to any recipient whatsoever;

-- and not to help any non-nuclear state acquire such weapons.

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Second, we shall cooperate fully in bringing the treaty's safeguards into being -- safeguards that will prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to weapons.

Third, we shall, as the treaty requires, facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We shall give particular attention to the needs of developing nations.

We shall share our technical knowledge and experience in peaceful nuclear research -- fully, and we shall share it without reservation. This will include very important new developments in electrical power generation, in agriculture, in medicine, industry and the de-salting of sea water.

Fourth, we shall continue our research and development into the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We shall make available to the non-nuclear treaty parties -- without delay and under the treaty's provisions -- the benefits of such explosions.

Finally -- in keeping with our obligations under the treaty -- we shall, as a major nuclear power, promptly and vigorously pursue negotiations on effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce existing nuclear arsenals.

It is right that we should be so obligated. The non-nuclear states -- who undertake with this treaty to forego nuclear weapons -- are entitled to the assurance that powers possessing them, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, will lose no time in finding the way to scale down the nuclear arms race.

We desire -- yes, we urgently desire -- to begin early discussions on the limitation of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems.

We shall search for an agreement that will not only avoid another costly and futile escalation of the arms race, but will de-escalate it.

I believe that this treaty can lead to further measures that will inhibit the senseless continuation of the arms race. I believe that it can give the world time -- very precious time -- to protect itself against Armageddon. And if my faith is well-founded, as I believe that it is, then this Treaty will truly deserve to be recorded as the most important step toward peace since the founding of the United Nations.

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Further, the non-proliferation treaty will serve not only as a deterrent to the spread of nuclear weapons, but also as a powerful stimulus for the peaceful use of the atom.

And, when this treaty comes into force, the growing number of nuclear power reactors around the world -- with their inevitable by-product of plutonium -- need no longer cause anxiety as potential sources of nuclear weapons material. Under the safeguards of the treaty, those reactors will be pledged and will be guaranteed as peaceful sources of energy -- as vital instruments of growth and development.

\* \* \* \*

My fellow citizens of the world, what we have achieved here today few men would have dared to even hope for a decade ago.

Nations that were long beset by differences in this great treaty -- found common ground in their need to use the incredible force of the atom for peace, and not for war.

From this ground that we have won here together, then let us press forward

- to halt and to reverse the buildup of nuclear arsenals;
- to find new ways to eliminate the threat of conventional conflicts that might grow into nuclear disaster.

And in the name of our common humanity, let us insure our survival -- so that we may achieve our high destiny on earth. Let us work for the ultimate self-interest of mankind: for that peace in which future generations may build a world without fear and without want -- a world that is fit for the sons of man.

In closing, Mr. President, permit me to pay my cordial respects to you. In your conduct of the affairs of this Assembly, Mr. President, you have won new honors for your country and for yourself.

Mr. Secretary General, we of the United States are very grateful for your contributions to the United Nations and to its universal goals of peace.

And to all of the delegates that are here assembled, to all of you who have labored hard and fruitfully throughout this historic session, we extend our sincere good wishes;

- and to those who are about to leave our shores, we bid each of you Godspeed and a safe and pleasant journey home.

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RESOLUTION ON SECURITY ASSURANCES ADOPTED BY THE  
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ON JUNE 19, 1968

The Security Council

Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of states to subscribe to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these states that, in conjunction with their adherence to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all states,

1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon state permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;
2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain states that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;
3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL

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PROVISIONAL

S/PV.1430  
17 June 1968

ENGLISH

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Monday, 17 June 1968, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. GOLDBERG

(United States of America)

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RICHARD ZORN, SENIOR REVIEWER  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL  
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I should like to make a statement as the representative of the United States.

During more than four years of negotiation on the non-proliferation treaty in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, one of the major problems considered was how to provide assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States that their security would be enhanced, rather than impaired, by their renouncing nuclear weapons in accordance with the treaty.

(The President)

This question was a subject of extensive public debate as well as of lengthy private negotiations. The conclusion reached by the sponsors of the present draft resolution was that, in addition to the security benefits provided by the treaty itself, further assurance of security could most appropriately be afforded in the context of the United Nations Charter, under which every Member of our Organization has assumed a solemn obligation to co-operate in the maintenance of peace.

The United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom -- as the other sponsors of the draft resolution have informed the Council -- therefore agreed to sponsor a draft resolution on security assurances here in the Security Council, the organ of the United Nations which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The text of this draft resolution now before the Council was first made public in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the representatives of those three Governments on 7 March of this year. A key paragraph of the resolution envisages declarations of intention by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in support of the provision of assurances to parties to the treaty. The substance of these proposed declarations of intention was likewise described to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and made public on 7 March.

The text of the draft resolution was also officially circulated to each Member of the United Nations as annex II of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, dated 19 March 1968. This document was circulated by the Secretariat as General Assembly document A/7072. This is the identical resolution which now lies before us in Security Council document S/8631, sponsored by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Thus the text of the draft resolution now before the Council, as well as the substance of the accompanying declarations of intention, have been public knowledge since 7 March last, and have been officially before all Members of the United Nations, including the Security Council, since 19 March.

During the debate on the non-proliferation treaty which began in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 26 April, the security assurances question was discussed in statements by many delegations, including my own. In my statement on 15 May, I reaffirmed the intention of the United States to make, in

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(The President)

conjunction with the Security Council's consideration of the proposed resolution, the formal declaration described in Geneva by the United States representative on 7 March. In the same statement I repeated the full substance of this intended declaration. During the same debate the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom likewise reaffirmed the intention of their Governments to make similar declarations at the same time.

In the course of the First Committee's consideration of this matter, several delegations informally indicated to us a strong desire that the Security Council should convene promptly to consider security assurances. To this end, on 12 June, immediately after the General Assembly's adoption of resolution 2373 (XXII), commending the non-proliferation treaty and requesting that it be opened for signature at the earliest possible date, the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom called for a meeting of the Security Council. At the same time they circulated to all the text of the draft resolution which now lies before the Council. On 14 June the United States also informally distributed to all members of the Council the text of the declaration which my Government proposes to make here today, and on the same date the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom delegations likewise informally circulated the texts of their declarations.

After appropriate consultation with the members of the Council, it was decided to convene the Council this afternoon to begin consideration of this important matter.

On behalf of my Government, I shall now read to the Council the formal declaration of the United States of America:

DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"The Government of the United States notes with appreciation the desire expressed by a large number of States to subscribe to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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(The President)

"The United States also notes the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security. Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States:

"Bearing these considerations in mind, the United States declares the following:

"Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. Therefore, any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression.

"The United States affirms its intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

"The United States reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

(The President)

"The United States vote for the draft resolution before us and this statement of the way in which the United States intends to act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations are based upon the fact that the draft resolution is supported by other permanent members of the Security Council which are nuclear-weapon States and are also proposing to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that these States have made similar statements as to the way in which they intend to act in accordance with the Charter."

Having made that declaration, I wish now to comment on the historic significance of the initiative being taken here today.

That the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, whatever their respective views on other matters, have now united in sponsoring this draft resolution, and in making solemn declarations in support of it, is a political fact of the first order. This concerted action by these major nuclear-weapon States introduces a powerful element of deterrence against aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression.

The United States believes that this Security Council resolution, and the declarations made in conjunction with it, will lay a firm political, moral and legal basis for ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon parties to the non-proliferation treaty.

(The President)

I know that all members of the Security Council will consider the value to their national security, and to that of all non-nuclear-weapon States which may become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of the security assurances made and sponsored by the principal nuclear-weapon Powers. In so considering them, each State should ask itself not "Will these assurances, combined with the treaty, give this country perfect security?" -- because there is, of course, no perfect security in this world -- but, rather, "Will these security assurances, combined with the non-proliferation treaty, give this country more security than it would otherwise enjoy?" The United States is confident that a careful appraisal in the light of this pertinent question will result in an affirmative answer by the Council, and that the adoption of this resolution will be a major contribution to international peace and security.

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## UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SOME SIGNIFICANT  
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE U.S.  
DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Post World War II Presidents of both parties have decried the spread of nuclear weapons. The Baruch Plan in 1946 proposed an international authority to own or control all "dangerous" atomic materials from the mining process to the manufacturing of finished products. This plan would have removed nuclear weapons entirely from national arsenals, but the Soviet Union refused to accept it.

In that same year, the Congress foreclosed the United States option to proliferate nuclear weapons to any other country with the adoption of the McMahon Act. Section 92 of the legislation which succeeds it, the Atomic Energy Act of 1964, as amended, now prohibits transfer of nuclear weapons in foreign commerce.

President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Plan resulted in a 1956 agreement to create an International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor peaceful nuclear activities around the world in order to guard against diversion of nuclear materials to bombs. This is the Agency that is charged with the responsibility for safeguards under the non-proliferation treaty draft.

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U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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President Eisenhower also made the first U.S. test ban proposal, noting that it would help keep additional fingers off the nuclear trigger. Secretary of State Dulles explained the motivation behind our non-proliferation policy in 1957 when he said:

"Already large nuclear weapons are so plentiful that their use in general war could threaten life anywhere on the globe. And as matters are going the time will come when the pettiest and most irresponsible dictator could get hold of weapons with which to threaten immense harm . . . Your government believes that this situation can be and should be remedied."

The Executive Branch concluded that, since we did not propose to proliferate, our interests would be served by securing 1) a promise from the Soviet Union to refrain from doing so, and 2) an agreement by possible recipients not to acquire nuclear weapons from any source.

In 1957, the United States, Britain, Canada and France submitted a package proposal which included the principle of non-transfer of nuclear weapons to the five-nation subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission.

Growing international support for preventing further nuclear spread was manifested when the so-called "Irish Resolution", was

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unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 4, 1961.

In 1963, in presenting the Partial Test Ban Treaty to the American people, President Kennedy said that it was a first step in a program to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. President Johnson's 1964 message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference gave the details of that program. It centered, of course on the achievement of a non-proliferation treaty.

On June 15, 1965, the U.N. Disarmament Commission (consisting of the full UN membership) passed a resolution by an overwhelming vote (83-1 with 18 abstentions) urging, among other things, that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) reconvene without delay and give priority attention to a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

On August 17, 1965, after extensive negotiations within the Atlantic Alliance, the United States submitted at the ENDC a Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. This document set out specific terms for an agreement for the first time. The Soviet Union presented its version of a draft treaty in the Twentieth United Nations General Assembly in September of 1965.

In 1966, the U.S. Senate achieved a broad consensus in support of a non-proliferation treaty. Senate Resolution 179,

which was sponsored by Senator Pastore and co-sponsored by 58 other Senators, passed with a heavy bipartisan vote of 84-0, with all absent Senators but one declaring themselves in favor. During the course of the hearings on this resolution, it became evident that no amendment would be made to the prohibition in the Atomic Energy Act on the "transfer" of atomic weapons in foreign commerce. Such an amendment had been regarded as necessary to authorize the provision of U.S. nuclear weapons to the proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force in NATO. The original United States draft of the non-proliferation treaty would have permitted such a force. As it became clear that no agreement on such a force within the alliance was likely, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to agree in the summer of 1966 upon the basic premise that a non-proliferation treaty must prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to any recipient.

Intensive bilateral talks were begun between the United States and the Soviet Union following the adjournment of the ENDC in August of 1966, beginning with discussions between the ENDC Co-Chairmen. In October, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met with President Johnson and with Secretary Rusk in Washington.

By mid-December 1966, we were able to submit to our NATO allies new draft formulations of the main parts of the treaty that we thought we might be able to negotiate with the Soviets



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while still maintaining U.S. and NATO security interests. This stage of consultation with our allies continued through January and early February, prior to the opening of the ENDC on February 21, 1967.

While the U.S. had originally hoped to complete the negotiations with the Soviets on a treaty text except for the safeguards article and submit it for the consideration of the Conference when it opened on February 21, the Soviets objected and said that they preferred to wait until a complete treaty draft, including an Article III on safeguards, had been worked out before agreeing to the submission of any text.

The safeguards problem arose out of the existence of two international safeguards systems -- one the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquartered at Vienna, and the other a system set up earlier by the European Atomic Community (Euratom) of the six Common Market countries.

While it had always been U.S. policy to work towards a single, world-wide system of safeguards, the Common Market countries were reluctant to allow the IAEA safeguards system to operate in their countries for fear that it would result in abandonment of the Euratom system. They felt the latter possibility would have an unfavorable effect on progress.

towards European unity. As a result the United States has been clear in its negotiations with the Soviets that both systems should be permitted to continue.

The Soviet Union was agreeable to mandatory safeguards on the non-nuclear signatories of the treaty, but believed those safeguards should be administered by the IAEA. From the outset the Soviets opposed the idea that the Euratom system is equivalent to IAEA, on the ground that Euratom inspections amount to self-inspection.

The United States continued its efforts to work out a solution satisfactory to our NATO allies in Euratom and, at the same time, acceptable to the Soviet Union.

The impasse continued but, on August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union presented to the ENDC separate, but identical drafts of a non-proliferation treaty with Article III, the safeguards provision, left blank.

In the months following August 24, members of the ENDC put forth various recommendations for amending the treaty text. For the most part, these reflected three areas of concern among the non-nuclear states: the treaty's relationship to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; the need to balance the obligations of non-nuclear states with positive steps by the nuclear powers towards disarmament; and the desires for assurance

against nuclear intimidation. Proposals were also made on such questions as duration, periodic review, and the number of parties required to ratify. The United States and Soviet Co-Chairmen of the ENDC considered various proposals while at the same time continuing to work towards agreement on Article III.

In the early fall of 1967, the Soviets suggested a new compromise draft safeguards article based in part on an earlier NATO draft. This proposal was presented to the capitals of alliance members, to the North Atlantic Council, and to Euratom for discussion. What emerged was the U.S. compromise draft of November 2, which was given a "green light" by NAC. Throughout November and December we urged Soviet acceptance of the November 2 draft as being the road through which agreement lay.

When the ENDC reconvened on January 18, 1968 after a month's recess, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a complete draft treaty, including the Article III approved by the North Atlantic Council in November, as a basis for further negotiations. This formulation was designed to provide a practical and effective safeguards article which took into account the interests of all countries desiring to adhere to the treaty. The safeguards required by Article III have the sole purpose of verifying that nuclear energy is not diverted by non-nuclear-weapon Parties from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The United States noted in an address at the ENDC the three principles that guided the formulation of this verification provision. First of all, the safeguards should be of such a nature that all parties can have confidence in their effectiveness. This means that the agreements to be negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must enable the Agency to carry out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion of nuclear material is taking place. Secondly, in discharging their obligations under Article III, non-nuclear weapon parties should be able to negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA individually or together with other parties. An agreement covering such obligations could be entered into between the IAEA and another international organization whose work was related to that of the IAEA, for example a regional safeguards system such as Euratom. Thirdly, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, provided that the IAEA could satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Negotiations on other aspects of the treaty continued at the ENDC until March 14 when the draft was reported to the UN General Assembly, where consideration of the treaty continued. Additional amendments, responsive to suggestions by various non-nuclear weapon

countries, were agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union. The most important revisions strengthen the provisions for sharing in the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Articles IV, V), and the provisions calling for further and prompt measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit existing arsenals (Preamble, Article VI).

A concluding preambular paragraph was also added to enhance the security of the signatories by reaffirming the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of force and threats of force in international relations.

Related to that last preambular paragraph is the concern expressed by a number of non-aligned countries that, should they adhere to a non-proliferation treaty and forego the option of developing nuclear weapons, they would subject themselves to possible nuclear blackmail. To deal with this problem, on March 7, the United States, Soviet and United Kingdom Representatives at the ENDC joined in introducing a draft UN Security Council resolution on security assurances. It was adopted by the Security Council on June 19 by a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions.

The resolution is intended to reassure non-aligned nations of their security should they become parties to the treaty. The resolution would not involve the United States in any new

commitment, but would recognize that "aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter."

The main provisions of the present draft non-proliferation treaty may be summarized as follows: The treaty would 1) prohibit nuclear weapon states from transferring to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them, 2) prohibit nuclear-weapon states from helping non-nuclear-weapon nations to develop their own nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 3) prohibit non-nuclear-weapon states from receiving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and from manufacturing their own, 4) provide for verification to assure that no nuclear materials are diverted by non-nuclear weapon states from peaceful activities to nuclear weapons, 5) encourage cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear nations to insure that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and 6) affirm the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon states to strive for effective measures to end the nuclear arms race and promote disarmament.

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The treaty, which will run for an original period of 25 years, will come into force when it has been ratified by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and 40 other signatories. On June 12, 1968, it was endorsed in the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 95 to 4 with 21 abstentions. The countries voting against the resolution of endorsement were Albania, Cuba, Tanzania and Zambia.

The treaty will be opened for signature on July 1, 1968 in Washington, London and Moscow. The President will then transmit it to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

ACDA/GC  
June 24, 1968

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**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS  
ON THE  
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY**

DECLASSIFIED BY/RELEASE AUTHORITY:  
RICHARD ZORN, SENIOR REVIEWER  
U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL  
DATE: DECEMBER 19, 2019

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Q. How do you account for the fact that the USSR has made common cause with the US on the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

A. Because the USSR has the same interest in the treaty as the US. Neither wants nuclear war and both are determined to do their utmost to avoid it. As between themselves, they know that neither can attack the other without being itself destroyed. They do not want others to start nuclear conflicts because they fear these would be likely to spread and involve the whole world -- including themselves. The interest of the nuclear powers and of all other nations is the same: to avoid the horror of nuclear war.

Q. What makes you so sure the Soviets won't violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty when they wish just as they have numerous other treaties?

A. It is in the USSR's interest to preserve this Treaty. The USSR has the same interest as the US in preventing the perilous spread of nuclear weapons.

However, if they violate, the US can renounce the treaty--all bets are off.

- Q. Possession of nuclear weapons by the US and USSR has acted as a deterrent to major war. Would not greater stability be achieved in other areas of the world if there was a balance of nuclear deterrent between rival nations?
- A. Nuclear weapons may have been a restraining factor in preventing the outbreak of war between the US and USSR. But other countries might be less rational, particularly if they were threatened by defeat in a conventional war (for example, in the Middle East), if they anticipated no effective retaliation, or if their rulers were about to be deposed and therefore had nothing to lose.

- Q. Wouldn't it be better to help countries like India and Japan avoid the Chinese threat by giving them purely defensive nuclear weapons, rather than risking their "going nuclear" and developing both an offensive and defensive weapons capability?
- A. There is no fool-proof way of rigging nuclear weapons to fire only defensively. Even if there were, the country which received them could learn how to make offensive weapons from the defensive ones it had been given. In any event, a neighbor or rival would have no way of assuring itself the weapons were purely defensive. It might therefore feel the need of going nuclear to protect itself. In any event, transferring defensive nuclear weapons to countries like Japan or India would violate Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Q. Doesn't signing the treaty mean giving up a basic right -- the right to develop nuclear weapons for self-protection if necessary?

A. Yes. But, if a non-nuclear country's rivals or neighbors also give up this right, all will benefit. The non-proliferation treaty is, in the first instance, in the interests of non-nuclear countries themselves, adding to their security against the development of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear neighbor and rival states, and sparing them the vast expense of developing such weapons themselves. This is why a number of the earlier initiatives in favor of a non-proliferation treaty were made by non-nuclear countries.

If a neighbor or rival later acquires nuclear weapons, a non-nuclear country can then withdraw from the treaty.

Q. Why go ahead without France and the Chinese Communists?

A. Since non-nuclear-weapon signatories will undertake in the non-proliferation treaty not to receive nuclear weapons or technology from any source, the threat of dissemination will be limited even if France and the Chinese Communists do not agree to the treaty's prohibitions on transfer of nuclear weapons or manufacturing "know-how."



- Q. Would the treaty bar a non-nuclear party from helping a non-nuclear non-party in making nuclear weapons?
- A. The treaty draft prohibits nuclear parties from helping any non-nuclear country, party or not. But an express prohibition on assistance by non-nuclear parties was thought unnecessary. When the question arose in Geneva discussion, however, the US representative responded as follows:

"It seems clear that a non-nuclear-weapon state which accepts the treaty's restrictions on itself would have no reason to assist another country not accepting the same restrictions to gain advantage from the fact in the field of nuclear-weapon development. If a non-nuclear-weapon party did nevertheless attempt to provide such assistance in the territory of a non-party, the presumption would immediately arise that these acts had the purpose of developing nuclear weapons itself, in violation of the treaty."

Q. Would the treaty interfere with existing arrangements within NATO for the defense of our allies against nuclear attack?

A. No. The 1965 Soviet draft non-proliferation treaty appeared to prohibit existing arrangements for the deployment in allied territory of US nuclear weapons under US custody and control, for the training of allied troops for defense against nuclear attack, and for allied consultations and planning for such defense. US representatives made clear that no treaty was possible if the Soviets intended to change these arrangements. The compromise agreed upon would not.

- Q. Why should the US be a party to any treaty which will impede the military (and eventual political) unification of Western Europe, perpetuate French nuclear dominance of the western half of the continent, and relegate both the FRG and Italy to second-class military status for all time? How can the NATO alliance expect to survive with this element of discrimination now legalized by the non-proliferation treaty?
- A. 1. The restraints which are now impeding movement toward European integration are not reinforced by a non-proliferation treaty.
2. The non-proliferation treaty would not prohibit progress toward military integration in Western Europe that did not involve a transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them. Progress could be made, e.g., on integrating conventional forces, establishing a common alert and warning system, a common logistics system, further integration of communications, and air defense.
3. The non-proliferation treaty does not prohibit a truly unified Europe from succeeding to the nuclear assets of a former national component, for example, the UK or France.

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- Q. Would the treaty permit the transfer of anti-ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads to NATO to be operated under NATO control?
- A. No. The treaty would prohibit the transfer of "nuclear weapons" or control over them to "any recipient whatsoever". This would, of course, include the transfer of ABM warheads, or control over them, to NATO. Since defensive weapons can be used offensively, or can be used to make offensive weapons, no other result would be consistent with the objectives of the treaty. The treaty would not, however, prohibit a US ABM system under US custody and control designed to protect NATO allies and deployed on their territory.

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Q. Will IAEA safeguards be effective?

A. The IAEA is now applying safeguards on peaceful nuclear programs in some 30 countries. In many cases these programs utilize uranium supplied by the United States under formal international agreements requiring such safeguards. Our AEC experts believe these IAEA safeguards are effective. The IAEA system will of course need to be expanded and new techniques will have to be adopted in the next several years to take on the new responsibilities of the non-proliferation treaty. But the IAEA is an on-going organization which was formed as the result of President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Plan and which has been strongly supported by the United States since then. Because of President Eisenhower's initiative, we have an existing organization with substantial experience to build on.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has consistently and repeatedly addressed the safeguards issue and urged a strong and viable Article III. On January 18, 1968, the Chairman of the Committee, in a statement on the floor of the Senate, addressed himself to the present draft Article III and said, "I am certain that with encouragement from the highest positions in EURATOM and in the International Atomic Energy Agency we can, and will, work out an appropriate and proper safeguards arrangement".

Q. Does Article III require that the US discriminate against non-nuclear countries which do not sign the non-proliferation treaty by refusing to ship them nuclear materials?

A. No, as long as such materials are safeguarded. Article III does not require any such result. After its safeguards requirements are in effect, the United States may ship nuclear materials and specialized equipment to non-parties provided the material is subject to the kind of safeguards called for by the treaty. If this requirement is met, there is no necessity for the consumer to be a party to the treaty.

- Q. Does this treaty reflect a retreat from U.S. standards requiring control mechanisms for any agreement with the Soviet Union?
- A. No. The fact that the treaty does not require inspection in the Soviet Union, or, for that matter, in any nuclear-weapon country party to the treaty, including the United States, is not a "concession". The objective of this treaty is to prevent non-nuclear-weapon countries from acquiring nuclear weapons, not to limit the right or capacity of any present nuclear power to produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, unlike other possible arms control agreements with the Soviet Union designed to so limit that country, inspection of the Soviet Union is not necessary to the purpose of the treaty.

Q. Is the safeguards article impracticable because it will be too expensive to implement?

A. No. Tentative figures which have been advanced by some critics of the treaty may well be over-blown since they do not take into account the virtual certainty that unit costs of safeguarding will be reduced as increased efficiency is introduced, based both on improved instrumentation and on the evolution of the safeguards system from its present small scale to a full-scale and going operation.

The relevant question is this: What will safeguards costs be as related to the cost of the nuclear power produced? Even without the expected improvements in efficiency, safeguards costs should be less than one percent of the cost of the power produced. It is also pertinent to note that safeguards will not be paid for directly by electric utilities or by their customers. They will be paid for by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which in turn received its money from assessments against the governments of member countries.

Finally, of course, these costs are a small price to pay to check nuclear proliferation and thus help reduce the risk of nuclear war. Considering the alternative--world-wide production of enough unsafeguarded plutonium to make thousands of bombs per year--the cost of safeguards is modest.



- Q. Can non-nuclear countries continue to receive materials without safeguards for the two-year period after the treaty goes into effect during which safeguards agreements are to be negotiated with the IAEA?
- A. Yes. This question arose because the safeguards article prohibits parties from shipping nuclear material or specialized equipment such as reactors to non-nuclear countries unless the nuclear material involved "shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article". But the US representative pointed out that the "safeguards required by this article" are

"safeguards to take effect not later than at the end of the specified period /two years/. They are not safeguards required immediately upon entry into force of the treaty."

The United States expects to continue during the transition period its present policy of supplying materials and equipment under present safeguards.

- Q. Article III requires non-nuclear parties to accept safeguards "as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA...". Does it not thereby require acceptance of a "blank system of control yet to be formulated"? Putting the question another way, is it not simply "an agreement to agree" and therefore of no validity?
- A. The answer to both these questions is no. Article III sets standards for the safeguards to be applied. They must be those set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded "in accordance with the Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system". Both the Statute and the system contain criteria for the conclusion of safeguards agreements. The method by which a State ordinarily assumes safeguards is by entering into an agreement with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute and the system. As is the case with safeguards agreements presently in effect with the IAEA, safeguards agreements pursuant to the non-proliferation treaty will probably incorporate by reference the relevant portions of the Agency's safeguards system. The exact terms incorporated will depend, for example, on the kind of reactors and other facilities involved.

Q. Will safeguards apply to any reactors of a non-nuclear country used for the propulsion of warships?

A. Article III provides for safeguards on nuclear materials in "all peaceful activities" because the statutory purpose of IAEA safeguards is to ensure that material or facilities under its control are "not used in such a way as to further any military purpose". Neither the IAEA's Statute nor its safeguards system provide for safeguards on military facilities. However, so far as is known by the United States, none of the approximately 150 research and power reactors in non-nuclear states is employed for military purposes.

Q. Why is it in the US interest to agree to Article V? Why should we not attempt to get back as much as possible of the extensive research and development costs which we have so far incurred in developing peaceful nuclear explosive devices?

A. 1. The technology required to develop and explode peaceful nuclear explosive devices is the same as that required to develop and explode a nuclear weapon. In order to insure that all proliferation is stopped, both peaceful and military devices must be prohibited.

2. Non-nuclear-weapon countries view it as unfair, in giving up nuclear weapons, to give up potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosive devices also. If they had to forego such benefits, many of them would not sign the non-proliferation treaty. United States agreement on Article V is a small price to pay to insure proliferation is banned.

- Q. Does Article VI mean that we have to sit down and negotiate a general and complete disarmament treaty with the USSR now, while we are fighting in Viet Nam?
- A. Article VI means we are committed to continue negotiating in good faith towards halting the nuclear arms race and achieving some reductions of nuclear arms. We have been doing this since World War II and would probably continue to do so, treaty or no treaty.

Q. Suppose, despite the treaty, a country having nuclear weapons should use them to attack or threaten a nation which does not have them. How would the victim be protected?

A. This is where the "security assurances" resolution, jointly proposed by the US, USSR, and UK, comes in. Under this draft resolution these three major nuclear-armed powers recognize that nuclear aggression, or the threat of nuclear aggression, would create a qualitatively new situation of particular danger to world peace and require immediate U.N. Security Council action. The political effect of the resolution, backed by parallel declarations from the US, UK and the USSR, is highly significant. The draft resolution, with such backing, is historic not only because it marks a new measure of US-Soviet cooperation, but also because it reflects the seriousness with which all three countries view the need for prompt action in a crisis to protect nations which adhere to the treaty.

- Q. Do the new security assurances of the United States replace US obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other defensive alliances to which the US is a party elsewhere in the world?
- A. No. US commitments under NATO and its other security treaties remain as strong as ever, and are of course paramount, in that they are specific pledges as part of military alliances. The security assurances in the UN framework are designed to give protection to the non-aligned countries which do not want to join alliances. Such assurances are significant because they represent the intention of nuclear-armed states to cooperate in accordance with the U.N. Charter to deal with nuclear aggression.

- Q. Suppose there is a delay in the U.N. Security Council or a veto?
- A. Paragraph 3 of the proposed UNSC resolution on security assurances refers to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if armed attack occurs. Its inclusion here reaffirms that, until positive action is taken by the Security Council, member nations of the U.N. may exercise this right, both individually and collectively.



- Q. Doesn't the "security assurances" resolution involve the US in new commitments to come to the aid of countries all over the world in the event of nuclear attack?
- A. No. The resolution and our statement of intention involve no new commitment to anyone. We have simply said we would seek immediate action by the Security Council--subject of course to US veto--in the event of nuclear threat or attack upon a non-nuclear party to the treaty.